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IN A NEW POLITICAL SPACE
1. BEFORE INDEPENDENCE
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is one of the units of the former Yugoslavia 
which emerged as independent countries in the early 1990’s. Following the example of 
neighbouring Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia, which declared themselves to be inde-
pendent states, Bosnia and Herzegovina also decided to pursue its own statehood.
The case of Bosnia, however, cannot be compared with that of any other republic 
of the same provenance. Composed of three principal nationalities (Serbs, Croats, and 
Muslims), it has always been an ethnic cocktail. Its ethnic makeup did not favour in-
ternal unity; on the contrary, in a rising tide of claims made by ethnic interests, its situ-
ation became exceedingly complex and difficult.
The parliamentary election in BiH conducted in late 1990 opened a path towards 
independence and sovereignty. The poll brought success to the Muslim Democratic 
Action Party (SDA) led by the then prime minister Alija Izetbegović, winning 86 
seats in a parliament of 240. The runner-up was the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 
which won 72 seats. The third major political movement present in the legislative 
body was the Croatian Democratic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ 
BiH), which secured 44 seats.1 Thus established, the parliament unequivocally con-
firmed the republic’s multi-ethnic character.2 The leaders of the winning parties 
formed a ‘grand coalition,’ which was naturally headed by themselves.
1 Cf. M. Bankowicz (ed.), Historia polityczna świata XX wieku. 1945-2000, Kraków 2004, p. 643.
2 According to a 1991 census, the most numerous group were the Muslims with 43.6% of the total, 
followed by the Serbs with 31.2%, and the Croats with 17.2%. Other ethnicities made up the re-
maining 8%. The census confirmed a continued rise in the Muslim population over the past years 
(P. Eberhardt, Między Rosją a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowościowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej 
w XX wieku, Warszawa 1996, p. 306).
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On 15 October 1991, the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed the 
example of the other republics, and announced their intention to proclaim inde-
pendence. Importantly, however, the decision was taken without the participation or 
consent of the Serbian deputies, leading them to express their indignation; as a result 
they decided to establish their own, separate representative body. In late February 
and early March 1992, a referendum was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 
creation of an independent state. The poll was boycotted by the Serbian population 
of the republic. As many as 99% of voters were in favour of independence. Faced 
with the near-unanimous endorsement of this crucial matter, expressed in this dis-
play of direct democracy, President Alija Izetbegović felt compelled to declare inde-
pendence, which he did on 3 March 1992. Yet the decision was not free from con-
troversy; the Serbs created obstacles in an effort to disrupt the approaching political 
situation, fearing the loss of their pre-existing status in the ethnic mosaic and in the 
republic’s structure. In response, they created a Republika Srpska within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on 27 March 1992. The declaration of independence triggered fierce 
fighting between, on the one hand, Croats and Muslims who supported independ-
ence, and Serbs on the other who opposed it.3 The civil war thus begun and lasted 
almost three years during which all three groups – Serbs, Croats, and Muslims – 
equally carried out ethnic purges. The traumatic events escalated almost from day 
one. Initially, the Serbs enjoyed the most success. Led by Radovan Karadžić, they 
formed a self-proclaimed Republika Srpska which failed to receive recognition from 
any state. Somewhat later, the same fate befell a Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia 
which was proclaimed on 3 July 1992.4 The war had many facets: it revealed strictly 
ethnic issues as well as political and ideological divisions. After all, the warring par-
ties stood for different cultures, traditions, and, more importantly, religions.5
The unending armed conflict came to the attention of the USA and NATO in mid-
1993. A general policy was adopted to weaken the militarily superior Serbs by such 
means of combined operations by Croatian-Muslim forces. Both parties being keenly 
interested, a Muslim-Croatian Federation was formed on 18 March 1994. In this re-
spect, American endeavours proved to be nearly successful.6 The conflict kept escalat-
ing, causing fears that the hostilities might spill over beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Such concerns produced a desire to bring about a peace accord between the warring 
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the US on 6 April 1992, and by the European Community 
on 7 April of the same year. On 22 May 1992, BiH was admitted to the UN. Cf. S. Wojciechowski, 
Integracja i dezintegracja Jugosławii na przełomie XX i XXI wieku, Poznań 2002, pp. 81-82; 
L. Podhorodecki, Jugosławia. Dzieje narodów, państw i rozpad federacji, Warszawa 2000, pp. 207-208.
4 R. Karadžić succeeded in mobilizing an almost 100,000-strong army, enabling the Serbs to drive 
the Muslim army from 70% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 These issues are commented on by many authors including M. Waldenberg, Rozbicie Jugosławii. Od 
separacji Słowenii do wojny kosowskiej, Warszawa 2003, passim; idem, Kwestie narodowe w Europie 
Środkowo-Wschodniej. Dzieje, idee, Warszawa 1992, passim; and idem, Narody zależne i mniejszo-
ści narodowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, Warszawa 2000, passim. Also cf. L. Podhorodecki, 
Jugosławia. Dzieje…, pp. 207-208.
6 Cf. M. Bankowicz, Historia…, pp. 811-812.
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parties. On 25 April 1994, an international Contact Group was formed by the USA, 
Russia, Britain, France, and Germany with a view to restoring peace. The Group was 
instrumental in the signing of as many as eighteen truces; none of them, however, were 
respected. One possible solution was the Vance-Owen peace plan which proposed that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina be divided into ten autonomous provinces with no more be-
tween them than a common central government. The provinces would be of mixed 
ethnic composition, with each of the major ethnicities dominant in one province. In 
addition, to avoid future conflict over Serbian claims, regions in which the Serbian 
population predominated would be arranged in a way that would ensure that they 
did not border with Serbia. Surprisingly, the Serbs accepted the plan despite the fact 
that it was unfavourable to them, and the Croats were in favour, too. Unfortunately, 
the Muslims rejected the solution.7 Both the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and another proposed by David Owen in cooperation with Cyrus Vance 
and Thorvald Stoltenberg, which would make Bosnia and Herzegovina a confedera-
tion of three republics, with the cities of Sarajevo and Mostar subject to international 
administration, failed to win the approval of the Muslims.8 Incessant warfare did noth-
ing to bring a resolution to the conflict any closer; nor were the intermittent peace talks 
any more successful. Faced with this situation, the UN and NATO felt compelled to 
take radical steps to put an end to the bloodshed and the increasing escalation of the 
conflict. In August 1995, NATO countries launched a series of aerial attacks on Serbian 
troops near Sarajevo. The action was a direct response to a July 1995 Serbian attack on 
Muslims in which they captured the city of Srebrenica and massacred its population. 
An end to the civil war was also hastened by the victory of Muslims and Croats over 
Serbian troops. The pivotal event was the regaining of the Krajna and East Slavonia, 
which the Serbs had seized at an early stage in the conflict. This fact coincided with 
Belgrade’s decision to withdraw its support for Radovan Karadžić’s polices. Such a turn 
of events aroused hopes for a speedy resolution of disputes and a conclusion of a peace 
accord.9 Towards this end, talks were initiated in Geneva in early September 1995 in 
an effort to end hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The talks were attended by the ministers of foreign affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, representatives of the Contact Group, 
and EU mediator Carl Bildt. Once convened, the body agreed to divide Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into two constituent parts, one called the Muslim-Croatian Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other the Republika Srpska. The government of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It 
was agreed that each part could have its own armed force and a self-government legiti-
mized by its own constitution. Unfortunately, the agreement did not include the exact 
dividing line between both constituent parts, nor did it resolve the complex matter of 
territory, which may lead to a future outbreak of a now-latent conflict. The Geneva 
7 Cf. M. Waldenberg, Rozbicie Jugosławii…, pp. 224-226.
8 For more on the subject, see ibid., p. 227.
9 L. Podhorodecki, Jugosławia. Dzieje…, pp. 210-211.
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talks failed to resolve all the sensitive issues between the opposing parties; nor was a fi-
nal peace consensus developed. It thus became necessary to hold another round of 
talks, with the venue this time outside Europe – in New York. During a meeting on 
25 September 1995, it was decided to establish joint bodies like a parliament, govern-
ment, collective presidency, and a Constitutional Court. A free, democratic election 
was announced to be held under the supervision of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. It is worth noting that the lack of binding decisions on bor-
ders and the territorial division did not impede the cessation of hostilities. A truce was 
signed on 10 October 1995. All matters that remained unresolved in New York were 
considered at the next meeting in Dayton, Ohio, on 1 November 1995.10 There, rep-
resentatives of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a representative of the EU, 
the US secretary of state, and the deputy-foreign minister of Russia met at the Wright-
Patterson air base to tie up the loose ends left after preceding decisions taken in Geneva 
and New York. A series of accords were agreed upon which restored peace, and was 
known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.11 
Notably, the general agreement came with as many as 11 annexes (1A Military as-
pects of the peace agreement and addenda; 1B Regional stabilization; 2 Internal in-
ter-ethnic boundaries and related issues; 3 Elections; 4 Constitution, 5 Arbitration; 
6 Human rights; 7 Refugees and displaced persons; 8 Committee for the Protection 
of National Heritage; 9 Operation of public utilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 10 
Civilian aspects in the implementation of the peace accord; 11 International policing 
forces).12 The chief aim of the accord was to achieve an integration of a state structured 
as a federation composed of two principal units, the Muslim-Croatian Federation and 
the Republika Srpska.13 The future of Sarajevo was decided by placing it under the 
Muslim-Croatian Federation’s supervision. Importantly, it was decided to prohib-
it those declared to be war criminals by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) based in the Hague from holding any public offices. Peace 
in BiH would be assured by a UN peace-keeping force.14 All final contentious issues in 
BiH were to be resolved in a peace treaty signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.15
10 S. Wojciechowski, Integracja i dezintegracja…, pp. 96-97.
11 President Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, President 
Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Present were also US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, EU representative Carl Bildt, and Russian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor 
Ivanov, cf. S. Wojciechowski, Integracja i dezintegracja…, p. 97.
12 Cf. W. Konarski, A. Koseski (eds.), Bałkany. Etnokulturowe podłoże konfliktów, Pułtusk 2006, 
pp. 153-169.
13 The former occupies 51% of the country’s entire area, the remaining part to belongs to the 
Republika Srpska.
14 Those were 60,000-strong IFOR (Implementation Force) units which were to take the place of the 
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) stationed there, cf. M. Kuczyński, Krwawiąca 
Europa. Konflikty zbrojne i punkty zapalne w latach 1990-2000: tło historyczn i stan obecny, Warszawa 
2001, pp. 231-232; and S. Wojciechowski, Integracja i dezintegracja…, pp. 97-99.
15 The treaty repeated the Dayton accords. A document of international calibre, it was signed by the 
same presidents as the Dayton accords. The provisions were signed by the presidents of the US 
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2. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Dayton accords created the legal basis for the political system of the independent 
state. By way of a reminder, the agreement was initialled on 21 November 1995, by 
the presidents of BiH, Serbia, and Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution was 
an inseparable element of the General Framework Agreement on Peace in BiH which 
was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The constitution was Annex 4 to the agre-
ement. It provided for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state with a parliamentary system 
of government.16 The constitution of BiH is not a large document as constitutions 
go. It consists of a preamble and 12 articles (I Bosnia and Herzegovina, II Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, III Responsibilities of and Relations Between the 
Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities, IV Parliamentary Assembly, 
V Presidency, VI Constitutional Court, VII Central Bank, VIII Finances, IX General 
Provisions, X Amendment, XI Transitional Arrangements, XII Entry into Force) and 
two annexes. The preamble is typical in meeting the generally accepted criteria for 
such introductions. It makes references to respect for human dignity, freedom, and 
equality, and to peaceful resolutions of conflicts. Thus the introduction to the supre-
me law incorporates universal values characteristic for democracies. Bosnians, Croats, 
and Serbs as constitutional nations of the Republic expressed their shared respect for 
international law. They also pledged to do their utmost to ensure the territorial inte-
grity and independence of their state.17 According to the 1995 constitution, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is a federal state composed of two main entities: the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (Art. I, clause 3). Further, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is a democratic state under law (Art. I, clause 2)18 which implements 
a wide range of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Art. II) guaranteed as one of 
the supreme principles of the state.19 It seems that in the present reality the newly cre-
and France, prime ministers of Russia, Britain, Germany, and Spain (then presiding in the EU), 
cf. W. Walkiewicz, Jugosławia: byt wspólny i rozpad, Warszawa 2000, p. 260.
16 The constitution of BiH was adopted quite unconventionally, with no participation from citizens, who 
should have been the most interested party. The wording of the constitution was decided by representa-
tives of the countries participating in the peace conference concluding the war in BiH. The act is consid-
ered an incomplete (“small”) constitution as it does not regulate economic matters. It is, moreover, a rigid 
constitution. Art. X of the constitution of BiH places the restriction that an amendment may be made 
by a 2/3 majority of the present and voting members of the Parliamentary Assembly. Further, no amend-
ment may in any case abolish or limit human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to Art. II.
17 Cf. preamble to the constitution of BiH of 14 December 1995.
18 This provision is to be understood literally as per definition accepted in constitutional law. A demo-
cratic state under the rule of law is a state governed by the law: its constitution is the supreme law 
which provides for institutions safeguarding this all-important principle.
19 According to Annex 6, a Human Rights Committee was formed which was intended to accord 
these matters special attention. Within the Committee’s structure is the Office of the Ombudsman 
(human rights advocate) and the Human Rights Chamber.
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ated Human Rights Committee is especially important, whose raison d’être is to reso-
lve issues of alleged or obvious crimes of discrimination, crimes committed by the po-
lice against citizens, administrative delays in issuing documents, freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, discriminatory court rulings, discrimination in government agen-
cies and schools (Art. II, clause 4). Importantly, the makers of the constitution took 
particular pains to extend protection to refuges and displaced persons. To improve 
their situation, a Committee for Refuges and Displaced Persons was created (Annex 7 
to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina). In 2001, 
the High Representative transformed it into a State Committee for Refugees.
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina pledged to observe human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual, broadly accepted civil liberties, and interna-
tional laws concerning human rights (Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex I to the BiH Constitution).20 According 
to Art. II clause 8 of the constitution of BiH of 14 December 1995, the government 
of the republic is obliged not to limit access to information concerning human rights 
to any organizations which monitor their implementation on its territory. Art. III of 
the constitution draws clear distinctions in the responsibilities between the republic 
and its institutions on the one hand, and those of its entities with their respective au-
thorities on the other. The central government of BiH retains competence in foreign 
policy, foreign trade, monetary and customs policies, financial resources to cover the 
republic’s international obligations, regulation of immigration policy and refugee 
relief, combating international and inter-entity crime, cooperation with Interpol, 
provision of inter-entity and international transportation and communication, and 
air traffic control.21 As per the principle of presumed competence, all matters not 
expressly vested by the constitution in the institutions of the republic remain the 
responsibility of both constituent entities of the federal structure: the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Both entities have a right to 
establish diplomatic contacts with neighbouring countries subject to the condition 
that such contacts do not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and are approved by the Parliamentary Assembly. Art. III clauses 
3 and 4 of the constitution states that the central government is responsible for the 
20 The following international laws apply: The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide of 1948, Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Protection of War Casualties 
of 1949, and Geneva Protocols I-II of 1977, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 
1951 and the Protocol to this convention of 1996, the Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women of 1957, the Convention Relating to the Solution of the Problems of Stateless Persons of 
1961, the International Convention on Eliminating all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966, the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment and Punishment of 1948, the 
European Convention on the Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
and Punishment of 1987, the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
of 1990, and the European Charter of Regional and National Languages of 1994.
21 Cf. W. Konarski, A. Koseski (eds.), Bałkany. Etnokulturowe…, pp. 172-173.
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security of all persons in its jurisdiction. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
may assume the competences of the respective entities only upon their prior request 
or when compelled to do so to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, politi-
cal independence, and the state’s international personality (Art. III, clause 5). As 
mentioned above, Bosnia and Herzegovina has adopted a parliamentary form of 
government. In accordance with Montesquieu’s tripartite separation of powers, the 
central government has been divided into the legislative, the executive, and the ju-
dicial branches. In BiH, the legislative power belongs to a bicameral Parliamentary 
Assembly composed of the House of Peoples (the upper chamber) and the House of 
Representatives (the lower chamber) (Art. IV). Significantly, the House of Peoples 
is not elected by popular vote. It consists of fifteen delegates representing the re-
spective ethnic communities inhabiting BiH territory (i.e., Bosnians, Croats, and 
Serbs). Candidates to this chamber are chosen by the parliaments of the respective 
entities according to the following parity: 2/3 of delegates come from the Muslim-
Croatian Federation (i.e., five Bosnians and five Croats), while 1/3 are selected by the 
Republika Srpska (five Serbs). In the BiH Federation, the House of Peoples names 
ten deputies, in the Republika Srpska the National Assembly elects five representa-
tives. The quorum in the House of Peoples is nine, provided there are at least three 
representatives from each of the constitutional nations (i.e., three Bosnians, three 
Croats, and three Serbs) (Art. IV, clause 1 of the Constitution).
It should be emphasized that the constitution’s ethnic rules are designed to maintain 
a balance between the nationalities represented on government bodies. Considering 
the background processes leading up to the creation of the new political system in 
the republic, such rules seem to be a distinctive feature of the new state. The lower 
chamber, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
unlike the House of Peoples, is chosen by general election which is direct, free, and 
secret (Art. IV, clause 2 of the constitution). The rule has been adopted that 2/3 
(that is, 28 deputies), are chosen from the BiH Federation, and 1/3 (14 deputies) 
from Republika Srpska. Like the House of Peoples, the House of Representatives is 
elected for a four-year term. The House of Representatives participates in legislative 
procedures and approves the composition of the Council of Ministers. Members of 
the House of Representatives are protected by legal immunity; that is, they are ex-
empt from prosecution and litigation for acts considered to be part of their parlia-
mentary duties. The combined chambers make up the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which enjoys competences typical of legis-
latures in other democratic states under the rule of law. These include the enactment 
of laws necessary to implement the decisions of the Presidency of the Republic or 
to perform the constitutional obligations of the Assembly; making decisions about 
the sources and volume of the revenue needed for the work of BiH institutions and 
international obligations; approving the budget of BiH institutions; and ratifying in-
ternational treaties signed by the Republic. In addition, its responsibilities embrace 
regulating any other matters under its obligation to perform tasks assigned to it by 
one of the entities of BiH. The parliament follows the principle that any laws passed 
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by the Parliamentary Assembly must be approved by each chamber. Laws are passed 
by the majority of deputies present. Here again, equal ethnic parity is strictly ob-
served in that a majority is valid if those voting are made up of at least 1/3 of deputies 
from each entity of the Republic.22 If no agreement is reached within the prescribed 
five days, the controversial resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly is deferred to 
the Constitutional Court (Art. IV, clauses 3e and 3f ).
The executive branch in the Republic of BiH consists of the Presidency of the 
Republic and the Council of Ministers (Art. V, clause 4a). The role of the head of 
state is played by a three-person Presidency, with each member representing one 
ethnic community: a Bosnian, a Croat, and a Muslim. The first two are elected in 
the Federation of BiH, and the representative of Serbs is chosen by the Republika 
Srpska. The term of office of each collective head of state is four years.23 Members 
of the Presidency set their own rules of action. From among their number they elect 
a Chairman. The process respects the rule that the one who wins the greatest popular 
vote in his constituency becomes the first Chairman. Then the others serve the office 
in rotation every eight months (Art. V, clauses 2a and 2b).24 Such clauses reaffirm the 
ethnic rule which is a distinctive feature of the contemporary political system of the 
Republic of BiH.25 For a collective Presidency to function, it is crucial for its members 
of different ethnic backgrounds to reach agreement, which in practice is not always 
easy. A lack of consensus is provided for by the 1995 Constitution of BiH in Art. V, 
22 Should this prove impossible, the speaker of the chamber and his deputies meet within three days 
and attempt to bring about a consensus. If even that is unsuccessful, a decision is made by the 
Chamber by a majority of those present and voting (Art. IV, clause 3d of the constitution). It is 
a typical systemic principle in BiH that the vital interests of each constituent nation must be pro-
tected. Consequently, whenever a decision of the Parliamentary Assembly would be harmful to 
one nation, its approval by a majority is insufficient. For such a decision to be taken, it should be 
supported by a majority of the present and voting deputies the House of Peoples of that national-
ity which voices objections. If this does not happen, the speaker of the House of Peoples convenes 
a Joint Committee with the aim of reaching an agreement. The committee is made up of three 
deputies, a Bosnian, a Croat, and a Serb.
23 In the period from October 1996 to October 1998, the Presidency included: Alija Izetbegović 
(Bosnian), Kresimir Zubak (Croatian), Momczilo Krajisznik (Serbian); in 1998-2002, Alija 
Izetbegović until 2000, after his resignation he was temporarily replaced by Halid Genjc, who 
served in the office until March 2001, and then Beriz Belkić chosen by the National Assembly (all 
Bosnian), Croats were represented by Ante Jelavić, removed by the High Representative in March 
2001, and Jozo Krizanović elected by the Parliamentary Assembly. At the time, the Serbs were 
represented by Živko Radišić. In 2002-2006, Bosnia was represented by Sulejman Tihić, Croatia, 
until March 2005, by Dragan Čović, who was removed by the High Representative, and Ivo Miro 
Jović chosen by the Parliamentary Assembly, and Serbia by Mirko Šarović until April 2003, from 
this point until the next election it was Borislav Paravac chosen by the Parliamentary Assembly. In 
the present term from October 2006 to October 2010 the members are Harios Silajdžić (Bosnian), 
Željko Komšić (Croatian) and the Serb Nebojša Radmanović. See at <http://www.electionworld.
org/bosna.htm> (accessed 5 May 2008).
24 Also cf. W. Konarski, A. Koseski (eds.), Bałkany. Etnokulturowe…, p. 176.
25 I wrote about this in E. Bujwid-Kurek, Państwa pojugosłowiańskie. Szkice politologiczne, Kraków 
2008, pp. 136-148.
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clause 2. The scope of responsibilities guaranteed to the Presidency is impressive and 
clearly indicates that it is an executive body. Its tasks include conducting the foreign 
policy of BiH, appointing ambassadors and other overseas representatives of the state 
(with a maximum of 2/3 of such representatives from the Federation of BiH), rep-
resenting BiH in international and European organizations and institutions, taking 
action to obtain membership of organizations and institutions to which the republic 
does not yet belong, negotiating and persuading the Parliamentary Assembly to agree 
to ratification of treaties signed by BiH, executing the decisions of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, proposing annual budgets following government recommendation, sub-
mitting to the Parliamentary Assembly reports of expenditure it has incurred at least 
once per annum, cooperating with international organizations and NGO’s in BiH, 
and performing any other tasks entrusted to it by the Parliamentary Assembly or the 
entities (Art. V, clause 3 of the constitution). Another important responsibility of 
the Presidency is to designate a prime minister. As to the relationship between the 
Presidency and the Parliament, the former is constitutionally entitled to dissolve the 
House of Peoples subject to Art. IV, clause 3g of the constitution. In an important 
provision, the constitution of BiH expressly states that members of the Presidency 
shall be the civilian command authority over the armed forces. To coordinate the ac-
tivities of the armed forces, members of the Presidency form a Standing Committee 
on Military Matters (Art. V, clause 5).
Apart from the collective Presidency, the state apparatus of an independent coun-
try like the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina contains a government (Council of 
Ministers). As has been mentioned, the appointment of the primus inter pares (Prime 
Minister) is made by the Presidency. The next move in forming a cabinet belongs to 
the newly appointed Prime Minister, who nominates his ministers. A newly formed 
government does not commence its functions until it receives a vote of confidence of 
the House of Peoples (Art. V, clause 4).26 The creation of more ministries suggested 
a large increase in the responsibilities of the Council of Ministers, which was granted 
many powers typical of a centralized executive. Such a solution was to be among the 
chief factors that helped to stabilize the political system of the young republic.27
A third branch of government is the judiciary, to which the lawmakers accord-
ed particular care. The nine-member Constitutional Court exercises this authori-
26 On the strength of the Dayton accords of 21 November 1995, only three ministries were estab-
lished: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Civilian 
Affairs. Two more were created in 2000: The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Human 
Rights. Even more were formed in 2002, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Security, 
and the Ministry of Transport.
27 The present author shares the position of P. Codogni, ‘Bośnia i Hercegowina’, Europa Środkowo-
Wschodnia, Vol. 13 (2003), pp. 54-55. Like all other government bodies, in the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the ministries implement the parity principle guaranteeing an equal share in gov-
ernment to all three constitutional peoples. By the end of 2002, each ministry included one Bosnian, 
one Croat, and one Serb, who rotated as Minister and Vice-Minister every week. However, at Paddy 
Ashdown’s suggestion, that was changed and since then each ministry is headed by a minister and 
two Vice-Ministers who serve their functions throughout their term, cf. ibid., p. 55.
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ty according to Art. VI of the constitution of the BiH. The court is composed of 
four judges selected by the Federation of BiH, two named by the Republika Srpska, 
with the other three appointed by the President of the European Court of Human 
Rights, who is required to make his decision in consultation with the Presidency. 
Judges are elected in different ways in the respective entities. For the Federation, 
they are chosen by its House of Representatives, and for the Republika Srpska the 
competent body is the National Assembly (Art. VI, clause 1 of the constitution). The 
Constitutional Court judges serve a five-year term and are not eligible for re-elec-
tion.28 This is meant to prevent partiality in rulings and to promote the Court as an 
objective and just body, especially since its purview is quite broad, even if it is typical 
for its kind of judicial power. Its responsibilities include ruling on matters relevant to 
observance and enforcement of the constitution, on the division of responsibilities 
between respective entities or between the republic and its entities, on the conform-
ity of legislation with the constitution, and expressing opinions on the conformity 
of the constitution of BiH with international law, such as the European Convention 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms together with its protocols. In addic-
tion to this, it also has appellate jurisdiction over court rulings anywhere in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Compared to the other institutions, the Constitutional Court is 
among the weakest links in the state’s political system. In particular, its rulings often 
fail to be implemented, resulting in a great deal of chaos which threatens the legal 
order in this newly independent republic.29
In order to offer a proper description of the political system of any country, 
due consideration must be given to its political parties, especially those that have 
a pronounced influence on political life; that is, those represented in parliament and 
thus having an impact on the country’s policies and on the effectiveness of decisions 
that are being implemented. The multi-ethnic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rightly contours its party system. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that multi-eth-
nicity is also reflected in political parties. There are parties that unite only Bosnians, 
or only Serbs, or only Muslims. There are those that include Serbs, Bosnians, and 
Muslims based on ethnic parity. The former include the Democratic Action Party 
(Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA), a typical ethnic party of Muslims, which won 
nine parliamentary seats in 2006.30 It stands out for being the first Bosnian party 
with a clear nationalist profile since Yugoslavia decided to give up one-party rule and 
introduce pluralism. The group still enjoys undiminished popularity. Another nota-
ble political force is the Independent Social Democrats’ Party (Stranka Niezavisinih 
28 The requirements set for this honorary post include being a distinguished lawyer with an unblem-
ished record. Judges appointed by the Chairman of the European Human Rights Tribunal must not 
be citizens of BiH or any neighbouring country.
29 Often it took a reminder from the High Representative for a decision to be implemented. 
A good example is the rotation in the offices of Chairman and Deputy Chairmen in the House 
of Representatives, which only took effect after a reminder from the High Representative. 
Cf. W. Konarski, A. Koseski (eds.), Bałkany. Etnokulturowe…, pp. 174-176.
30 It was formed in October 1990 by Alija Izetbegović, Muhamed Filipović, and Fikret Abdić.
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Socjaldemokratu, SNSD), which is particularly active in the Republika Srpska.31 In 
the 2006 parliamentary elections, it entered the House of Representatives with seven 
deputies. Its is headed by the present premier of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, 
while one of its members, Niebojsza Radmanović, represents the Serbian minority 
in the Republic’s Presidency. Another major group is what is possibly the most lib-
eral, multi-ethnic Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka Bosne i Hercegovine, 
SBiH). Apparently free form a nationalist slant, this party won as many as eight 
seats in the House of Representatives in 2006.32 The Social Democratic Party of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Social Demokratka Partija Bosna i Hercegowina, SD BiH) 
led by Zlatko Lagumdžija (the former chief of diplomacy) is present in the House 
of Representatives with five deputies, while one of its members, Žlejko Komsić, 
was delegated to the Presidency.33 A clearly right-wing party of Bosnian Serbs is 
the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratka Stranka, SDS), which only se-
cured three seats in the House of Representatives in 2006.34 One more party with 
three representatives in the House is the independent Croatian Democratic Party 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska Demokratka Zajednica Bosna i Hercegovina, 
HDZ BiH).35
It would be a mistake to reduce the political scene to relevant parties for they are not 
the sole political players involved in decision-making and the further development of 
the political system. It is only appropriate to mention other parties which, although 
not represented in parliament, remain significant actors on the political scene. They in-
clude the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party (Bosnanskohercegovaczka Patriotska 
Stranka), the Democratic People’s Community (Demokratska Narodna Zajednica), 
New Croatian Initiative (Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa, NHI), the Croatian Peasants’ 
Party (Hrvatska Seljaczka Stranka, HSS), the Democratic Progress Party (Partija 
Demokratskog Progresa, PDP), the Democratic People’s Alliance (Demokratski 
Narodni Savez), the Liberal-Democratic Party (Liberalna Demokratska Stranka), 
and the Civic Democratic Party (Gradjanska Demokratska Stranka, GDS).36
31 The party was created in 1996 by independent members of a parliamentary club in the National 
Assembly of Republika Srpska. It merged with the Democratic Party of Socialists in 2001.
32 The party’s main tenets included a centralized state and the abandonment of divisions of peoples as 
inhabiting territorial units.
33 The party was founded in 1999 on the initiative of two parties: the Social-Democratic Party 
(Socijaldemokratska Partija – SDP) and the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(USD BiH).
34 The party was founded in 1990 with Mladen Bosić as its leader; its members included the infamous 
politician Radovan Karadžić, accused of crimes against humanity; cf. E. Bujwid-Kurek, Państwa 
pojugosłowiańskie…, passim.
35 The party was founded in 1990 as a branch of the Croatian Democratic Community in Croatia. It 
split to produce in 2000 a fairly powerful group of moderate politicians led by Kresimir Zubak; it 
was they who created the party named the Croatian People’s Initiative.
36 Cf. J. Wojnicki, Przeobrażenia ustrojowe państw pojugosłowiańskich (1990-2003), Pułtusk 2003, 
pp. 221-224. The issue is also addressed in E. Bujwid-Kurek, Państwa pojugosłowiańskie…, 
pp. 136-148.
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3. SPECIAL WAYS OF MANAGING PUBLIC LIFE
The new state faced special challenges as a result of Balkan realities. Its multi-ethnicity 
has triggered, and may continue to threaten to do so in the future, conflicts of a na-
tionalist nature. Hence it has been necessary to institute preventive measures which 
would guard against a recurrence of such a danger. To this end, the office was cre-
ated of High Representative, which was responsible for civilian matters.37 Apart from 
this safeguard in the civilian sphere, an International Peace-Keeping Force is pre-
sent to maintain peace in this highly charged ethnic situation. This means especially 
the international Implementation Force (IFOR), which was deployed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina almost immediately after the peace accord was signed. It replaced the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which had been previously statio-
ned there. The chief tasks passed on to IFOR included ensuring implementation of 
the Dayton accords, supervising the defined inter-ethnic boundaries and external 
borders, protecting humanitarian missions present on BiH territory, monitoring po-
pulation migrations, supervising mine-sweeping operations, overcoming any effects 
of the war, and creating a favourable climate for a truly free election according to ci-
vilized European standards. After IFOR had completed its mission, the UN Security 
council decided that its place could be taken by a Stabilization Force (SFOR) with 
only half the number of the previous personnel, which could address many more 
extra-military aspects of the republic’s security.38 The 1995 Dayton accords provided 
for the creation of the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(OHR). The office was given a set of difficult tasks. First, the High Representative, 
who represented the international community including the UN, was charged with 
supervising the implementation of the Dayton accords in civilian matters. He was 
given competence to use the so-called Bonn authorization39 which gave him the 
power to remove officials in both entities of the republic if their behaviour could 
hamper the implementation of the peace process, and in especially controversial or 
difficult situations. In cases when the parties were unable to establish a consensus, 
he was authorized to act on his own discretion.40 It should be noted that from the 
moment this office was introduced to Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e., from 1995 until 
30 June 2008, the remit of the High Representative kept evolving. At first, it embra-
ced supervising the implementation of the peace process, but later it was extended to 
37 The constitution of BiH of 14 December 1995, does not legitimize this office; its legal guaran-
tees are provided by Annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
38 The decision was taken in December 1996. Such peculiar management of the country evolved after 
December 2004. These troops were successfully replaced by European Union forces.
39 That authorization was added to the Dayton accords in 1997.
40 The office of the High Representative was served by the following persons: Carl Bildt (Swedish), 
Carlos Westendorp (Spanish), Wolfgang Petritsch (Austrian), Paddy Ashdown (British), Christian 
Schwarz-Schilling (German), and now Miroslav Lajčak (Slovak).
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supervision of the work of civilian organizations and institutions by providing them 
with guidelines towards a more effective implementation of the civilian aspects of the 
peace accord. Finally, the High Representative was authorized to intervene if neces-
sary in the work of respective government bodies in order to ensure that they proce-
eded according to the law and democratic standards. Particular attention was paid to 
the need to implement human rights as laid down in the UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 and as contained in other recognized international laws 
which included specific rules stemming from Human Rights of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
generation.
In the context of the discussion presented above, one may reflect on what will 
happen when the High Representative’s mandate finally expires, i.e., when no other 
politician is elected for another term to safeguard peace in a state with such a com-
plex structure. Such a situation has been anticipated. According to a UN decision, 
the mandate expires on 30 June 2008. Apparently, international bodies have decided 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina, although young in independent statehood, has met 
the required standards, and they have confidently concluded that it will rise to all the 
difficult challenges which used to arouse mistrust. If indeed a watchdog is no longer 
indispensable to maintaining peace in the republic, then this suggests, for the present 
at least, that its constituent nationalities have grown up and their behaviour and at-
titudes attest to their maturity and readiness for peaceful coexistence. We may only 
hope that such events as the independence of Kosovo do not trigger claims such as 
those that spurred the conflict of the 1990’s.
Translated by Tadeusz Stanek
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Dr. hab. Ewa BUJWID-KUREK, political scientist, lecturer at the Institute of 
Political Studies and International Relations, Jagiellonian University. She has twice 
been a scholar at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Journalism and Political 
Science (1984 and 1991). She has authored: Samorząd “wąskich struktur społecznych” 
w SFR Jugosławii (doświadczenia praktyczne) (1991), Myśl polityczna i państwowo-
-ustrojowa Svetozara Markovicia 1846-1875 (2000), Państwa pojugosłowiańskie. Szkice 
politologiczne (2008), and many articles and reviews (including “Przejawy kontynu-
acji a procesy zmian w systemie społeczno-politycznym współczesnej Jugosławii (dok-
tryna, realia i doświadczenia praktyczne)” (1991), “Parlamentarizam na Poljskem” 
(1991), “Międzynarodowe implikacje rozpadu Jugosławii” (1996), “System partyjny 
Republiki Serbii” (1996), “Radikalizam u programu Srpske Radikalne Stranke na 
osnovu izbornog programa” (1996); “Współczesne etnopolityczne problemy państw 
postjugosłowiańskich” (2002), “Prawa cziełowieka w konstitucijach nekatorich 
postjugoslowianskich gosudarstw (Chorwacja, Słowenia, Macedonia)” (2003), 
“Mniejszości narodowe Polski i Chorwacji w transformacji ustrojowej” (2004), 
“Unia Europejska a regionalne inicjatywy integracji i współpracy międzynarodowej” 
(2004)). Her book reviews include J. Kornhauser (ed.), Przemiany w świadomości i kul-
turze duchowej narodów Jugosławii po 1991 roku, Kraków 1999, and M. Waldenberg, 
Rozbicie Jugosławii. Od separacji Słowenii do wojny kosowskiej, Warszawa 2004. Her 
main interests focus on the problems of Central-Eastern Europe, with particular em-
phasis on post-Yugoslav Balkan states.
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